Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience

Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied in isolation. Contingency is central for converging first- and second-person approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold first-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective fundamentally involves first-person contributions

Body conscious?:Interoceptive awareness, measured by heartbeat perception, is negatively correlated with self-objectification

BACKGROUND: 'Self-objectification' is the tendency to experience one's body principally as an object, to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for the poorer interoceptive awareness observed in women, as measured by heartbeat perception. Our study is, we believe, the first specifically to test this relationship. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Using a well-validated and reliable heartbeat perception task, we measured interoceptive awareness in women and compared this with their scores on the Self-Objectification Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire. Interoceptive awareness was negatively correlated with self-objectification. Interoceptive awareness, public body consciousness and private body consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in self-objectification. However, private body consciousness was not significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness, which may explain the many nonsignificant results in self-objectification studies that have used private body consciousness as a measure of body awareness. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: We propose interoceptive awareness, assessed by heartbeat perception, as a measure of body awareness in self-objectification studies. Our findings have implications for those clinical conditions, in women, which are characterised by self-objectification and low interoceptive awareness, such as eating disorders

From the Fact to the Sense of Agency

This chapter reviews the empirical literature and contrast explicit and implicit tasks investigating the experience of agency with the aim of identifying the functional and neural signatures of the sense of agency. From the design of nonecological situations where there is ambiguity over the authorship of an action to the implementation of control conditions of passive movements that make little sense in our everyday waking life, the reviewed studies have tried to identify the key elements of what constitutes the sense of agency in humans. The exact interplay between conscious intentions and behavior, and the balance between predictive and postdictive processes remain controversial. However, the empirical investigation of the fact of agency, that is, the study of situations where people unambiguously produce voluntary actions, suggests that self-generated behavior changes the perception of one’s body and the external world by integrating temporal and spatial representations of movements and their effects on the world

Being a beast machine: the somatic basis of selfhood

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body ‘from within’) have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of ‘instrumental interoceptive inference’, which emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood, and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying – contrary to Descartes – that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as ‘beast machines’

Balancing the "inner" and the "outer" self:interoceptive sensitivity modulates self-other boundaries

Distinguishing self from other is necessary for self-awareness and social interactions. This distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration dominated by visual feedback. However, self-awareness also relies on the processing of interoceptive signals. We contrasted the exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self to investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction between the perception of the self from the outside and from within. Multisensory stimulation between self and other was used to induce controlled changes in the representation of one’s identity. Interoceptive sensitivity predicted the malleability of self-representations in response to multisensory integration across behavioral, physiological and introspective responses, suggesting that interoception plays a key modulating role in the self-recognition system. In particular, only participants with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation. These results support the view that interoceptive predictive coding models are used to monitor and assign the sources of sensory input either to the self or to others, as well as support the hypothesis of the insular cortex as a convergence zone in the processing and global representation of the material self given its involvement in both interoceptive feelings, multisensory integration and self-processing